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INTRODUCTION 
There is a vast literature on the Populism movement of the 1890s.1  
The Populists were the largest and most indigenous political 
movement this nation ever witnessed.  The movement was large, 
radical, exuberant, and organized from below; predominantly, 
                                                          
 * Professor Emeritus, American University, Washington College of Law.  This Article 
is a chapter from a book in progress by Professor Wechsler entitled, THE FALL AND 
RISE OF SECTION 1983.  The chapter provides background to the decision by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Homes in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).  Burt gratefully 
acknowledges the tireless work of his many student research assistants without whom 
this project would not have come to fruition. 
 1. For further reading on Populism in the nineteenth century, see generally JOHN 
B. CLARK, POPULISM IN AMERICA (1926); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE:  
THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976); ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN 
POPULISM:  A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1877-1898 (1993); WILLIAM ALFRED PEFFER, POPULISM, 
ITS RISE AND FALL (Peter Argersinger ed., 1991). 
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though not entirely, composed of tillers of the soil; class conscious, 
often joined by trade unions and workers of all stripes, widely 
composed of women, democratic; in some places, like the Northeast, 
little more than a nuisance; in other areas, like some parts of the 
South and Prairie States, a serious threat to those who governed.2 
Nothing comes from nowhere, nothing without progenitors.  That 
was true of Populism and its offspring, the Peoples’ Party.  It had 
numerous ancestors of various disparate visions.  These post-
reconstruction modules included the Grange,3 the Greenback Party,4 
the Union Labor Party,5 and the Farmers’ Alliance.6 
                                                          
 2. In examining the causal connections between Populism and “legal” 
disenfranchisement of blacks and poor uneducated whites, I have concentrated on 
Alabama without intentionally ignoring a multitude of other compelling and related 
events in other southern states during the Populist era.  I have targeted Alabama for 
the following reasons: (a) the availability of a complete and lengthy transcript of 
Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Convention that effectively disenfranchised blacks; 
(b) an abundance of fine, and, I’m happy to say, often conflicting scholarly material 
on Alabama Populism; (c) Alabama had, I believe, one of the most powerful Populist 
movements in the South, seriously threatening its Bourbon ruling elite; (d) Alabama 
Populists managed to develop various credible and respectful ways of working with 
blacks, though not without wrenching conflicts; (e) Alabama was the first state to 
adopt a “fighting grandfather” clause; (f) an important case, Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 
475 (1903), involving among other things, Alabama’s newly enacted grandfather 
clause, was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1903; and (g) none other 
than the august Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., fresh to the United States 
Supreme Court bench, wrote the Giles majority opinion, a veritable judicial 
shipwreck, sometimes overlooked by thoughtful Supreme Court observers and 
Holmes aficionados. 
 3. The Grange, or the Order of Patrons of Husbandry, was a progressive 
agricultural organization formed on December 4, 1867 in Washington, D.C.  For 
further reading on the Grange, see generally CHARLES GARDNER, THE GRANGE, FRIEND 
OF THE FARMER: A CONCISE REFERENCE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S OLDEST FARM 
ORGANIZATION, AND THE ONLY RURAL FRATERNITY IN THE WORLD, 1867-1947 (1949); 
DENNIS S. NORDIN, RICH HARVEST:  A HISTORY OF THE GRANGE, 1867-1900 (1974). 
 4. The Greenback Party was a political organization formed in 1874 to promote 
currency expansion.  The members were primarily farmers from the West and the 
South who supported inflation of currency values in order to wipe out farm debts.  
The Greenback Party eventually dispersed and its members became figures in the 
Union Labor Party and the Populist Party.  For further reading about the Greenback 
Party, see generally SIMON NEWCOMB, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF OUR FINANCIAL POLICY 
DURING THE SOUTHERN REBELLION (Michael Hudson ed., 1974); GRETCHEN RITTER, 
GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTI-MONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF 
FINANCE IN AMERICA (1997); IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879 (1964). 
 5. After the Greenback Party disappeared, there were attempts to reorganize 
under labor leadership.  In 1887, members of the Grange, the Greenbackers, and 
Farmers’ Alliance held a convention to organize the National Union Labor Party.  
Soon after, the Greenback-Labor Party, an intermediate step in the dissolution of the 
Greenback Party, declared itself dissolved.  The Party’s platform opposed land 
monopoly, contract and Chinese labor, and favored a graduated income tax and 
direct election of Senators.  See WILLIAM WARREN ROGERS, THE ONE-GALLUSED 
REBELLION 125-30 (2001). 
 6. After the Civil War, southern farmers saw much hardship as their economic 
mainstay, cotton, dropped dramatically in price.  In September 1877, farmers 
gathered in Texas to discuss their situation and began the National Farmers’ Alliance 
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* * * * * 
During the political storms that swept the South from 1886 to 1896, 
the Farmers’ Alliance, quickly succeeded by the more politically 
minded and powerful Populists, shook the pillars of the ruling house, 
which consisted of the “Redeemers,”7 the Democratic Party, the 
Bourbons,8 the southern oligarchy, and the black belt aristocracy.  
This overlapping ruling combination had reigned in the South since 
the end of Reconstruction.  The Populist challengers were primarily 
those in financial straits.  They were, predominantly, small land-
owning farmers, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and laborers, urban 
and rural.  They were white, and they were black.  They were men, 
and they were women. 
For those days and in many respects, for these days too, theirs was a 
radical program: public ownership of railroads and utilities; a 
graduated income tax; meaningful debtor relief; popular election of 
President and Senators; a free and fair ballot honestly counted; 
powerful farm cooperatives; national treasury assistance to farmers at 
low interest rates; increased monetary supply; reapportionment of 
political units; federal public works programs; and more.  They 
vigorously condemned, among other things, corporate monopoly, 
“ring rule,” convict labor, high interest rates, national banks, private 
police, under-taxation of wealth, railroad depredations, and 
corporate corruption of state and local legislative bodies.  Many 
Populists had in mind establishing a society much healthier and more 
democratic than that which they (or the nation) had ever witnessed.  
Frightened southern elites excoriated these Populists as “anarchistic,” 
                                                          
and Industrial Union, more commonly referred to as the Southern Farmers’ 
Alliance.  For further reading on the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, see generally DONNA 
A. BARNERS, FARMERS IN REBELLION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’ 
ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY IN TEXAS (1984); W.L. GARVIN & J.O. DAWS, HISTORY 
OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND COOPERATIVE UNION OF AMERICA (1887); 
ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., POPULIST VANGUARD:  A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’ 
ALLIANCE (1975). 
 7. “Redeemers” and “redemption” were part of the terminology—nicely attuned 
to southern religion—invoked by conservative Democratic party leaders in ridding 
the South of Reconstruction in the first half of the 1870s.  As in salvation, the 
“Redeemers,” as they saw it, had “saved” the South from the combined wicked evils of 
northern vindictiveness, the Republican Party, carpetbaggers, scalawags, corruption, 
and “Negro domination.” 
 8. See ALLEN JOHNSTON GOING, BOURBON DEMOCRACY IN ALABAMA 1874-1890, at v 
(1951) (explaining that many historians use the term “Bourbon” as a name for 
southern democratic leaders who resisted Reconstruction policies and took power in 
the South after Reconstruction).  The term was originally used by Radicals during 
Reconstruction to describe the ultraconservatives in southern society.  Id.  Its history 
harks back to the French royal family reigning intermittently in France and 
elsewhere on the continent from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.  
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 224 (3d ed. 1996). 
WESCHLER.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:38 PM 
26 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:23 
“communistic,” “ignorant,” “vicious,” and “nigger-loving,” along with 
a spate of other scurrilities. 
Populists, coming out of the Farmers’ Alliance in the late 1880s, 
turned to politics when their plans for cooperatives, money, credit, 
banking, and transportation, failed to ease their economic woes 
significantly.  The political structures they built varied from state to 
state, depending upon local conditions and local leadership.  In some 
states, it was a new party, the Peoples’ Party, in which Populists chose 
to spike their staff and unfurl their banners.  In other states, Populists 
stayed in the Democratic Party, creating a progressive wing within it 
for the announced purpose of capturing it from their overlords: the 
Bourbons, who dominated the Party.  In Alabama, the Jeffersonian 
Democrats, the reform wing of the Democratic Party, existed side by 
side with the Peoples’ Party.9 
As challengers of the existing order, the Populists developed a 
keen understanding of the necessity to form coalitions with other 
groups who also were being excluded from power and lacked 
meaningful control over their own existence.  They built strategic 
coalitions with labor, with blacks, and, subject to time, place, and 
conditions, with Republicans (or black Republicans), Democrats, 
Socialists, labor parties, Greenbackers, Prohibitionists, and 
Independents.  Nor did the Populists fail to include in their numbers 
the majority of adult Americans who, for the most part, could not 
vote at all:  women. 
These were hard times, and the distressed reached out to each 
other for support.  This coming together, this sharing of experiences, 
this search for solutions by people barely eking out a living, 
scratching the earth, fretting over cotton, floundering in debt, this 
questioning of the inevitability of existing arrangements, proved 
increasingly threatening to the Bourbons.  Moreover, here was a 
growing breed, restive whites—Alliancemen, Populists—no longer so 
politically paralyzed by Bourbon myths about Reconstruction, black 
domination, and Redemption, to catch the nearest way.  Here was a 
politically emboldened species, many of its leaders now daring to 
offend southern mores and Bourbon power by appealing to blacks 
for support, joining with them at times in incipient alliances, however 
                                                          
 9. Republicans were not liked in the South because of their role in 
Reconstruction policy.  Every Alabama state official elected between 1874 and 1892 
was a Democrat.  When Reuben Kolb, a leader of the Farmers’ Alliance, sought the 
1890 Democratic nomination for governor, the state Democratic Party used 
fraudulent tactics to defeat him.  These events led Alliance supporters to form the 
Jeffersonian Democratic Party in 1892, which nominated Kolb for governor against 
Democratic nominee Thomas Goode Jones.  See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 161, 213-16. 
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spotty, tentative, and inconsistent.  Quite a remarkable feat, this 
sporadic bi-racial coalition, blemishes and all, occurring a mere 
twenty-five years after a bloody Civil War. 
Certainly, the Populist coalition had its gnawing differences.  Sharp 
quarrels occurred over the ultimately defeated legislation forwarded 
by Henry Cabot Lodge in 1890 that provided for supervision of 
federal elections.10  Additionally, the (white) Farmers’ Alliance 
opposed the 1891 cotton-pickers’ strike, organized and supported by 
various members of its organizational ally, the Colored Farmers’ 
Alliance.11  The shifting and loose black/white Populist relationship 
somehow roughly managed to ride out these weaknesses until the 
ultimate collapse of Populism with the fatal presidential election of 
1896.12  In the interim, this restive racial association engaged in a 
shared endeavor to overcome an economic system and its partner, 
the government, which kept so many people, both white and black, 
poor, overworked, undereducated, and politically impotent.  The 
alliance sought to replace this system with what the Populists liked to 
call the “cooperative commonwealth.”  I agree with the conclusion of 
Gene Clanton that: 
Populists, despite a gale of criticism and outrageous 
misrepresentation, fought the good fight; they mounted what was, 
at least until the civil rights movement five decades later, the most 
significant mass democratic movement in American history, an 
extraordinary effort that continues, nearly a century later, to 
inspire and fascinate.13 
I do not wish to leave the impression that southern blacks flocked 
headlong into the Populist Party, abandoning the party of Lincoln in 
droves, or severed all political connections with the Democratic Party 
with its veneer of protective paternalism.  But many blacks were in 
                                                          
 10. See Henry Cabot Lodge, The Coming Congress, 149 N. AM. REV. 293, 297-99 
(1889) (indicating that “[t]here can be almost as little question of the expediency of 
a simple but efficient statute which shall make federal election as honest as possible 
. . . for it would greatly reduce, if not entirely prevent, violence, fraud, false counting, 
and the use of money for corrupt purposes.”). 
 11. The Colored Farmers’ Alliance was organized in Texas on December 11, 
1886, and led by General R. M. Humphry, a white man.  The Alliance may have 
evolved from secret rural societies.  In 1891, the total membership of the Alliance was 
estimated at 1.2 million.  ROGERS, supra note 5, at 141.  For further reading about the 
Colored Farmers’ Alliance, see generally Martin Dann, Black Populism: A Study of the 
Colored Farmers’ Alliance through 1891, 2 J. ETHNIC STUD. 58 (1974). 
 12. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 318-30 (highlighting that in 1896, the Populists 
nominated William Jennings Bryan, as did the Democratic Party, against Republican 
William McKinley).  Infighting within the Populist Party, illustrated by the 
controversial nomination of the Bryan ticket, eventually led to dissolution.  Id. 
 13. GENE CLANTON, POPULISM, THE HUMANE PREFERENCE IN AMERICA 1890-1900 xiv 
(1991). 
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fact more receptive to the Populists and their program than they were 
to the lily-white southern Republicans14 and the Democratic Party of 
the black belt Bourbons. 
In some places, like North Carolina, Populists were highly 
successful.15  In other southern states, like Florida and Arkansas, their 
impact was less.16  In Alabama, on which we focus our attention, the 
Populists enjoyed important electoral and legislative victories, 
notwithstanding losses in three bitterly fought battles for the 
governorship.17  The southern Populists, for almost a decade, 
mounted a fierce, hydra-headed challenge to the Democratic Party, 
to the southern oligarchy, and to the political/economic order they 
fashioned. 
What made the Bourbons particularly apprehensive was that in this 
struggle over power, blacks regained a modest measure of the 
political significance they lost with the collapse of Reconstruction.  In 
this new era of the Populist challenge, blacks now held an all-
important balance of power.  In Alabama, for instance, blacks 
constituted forty-five percent of the population.18  It is true that 
through intimidation and violence, black voting in Alabama, as well 
as elsewhere in the South, declined substantially after 
Reconstruction.  However, the black vote always remained a force.  
The political parties vied for that vote.  One persistent suitor, the 
Democratic Party, seemingly oblivious to the striking contradiction of 
being the sworn party of white supremacy, while simultaneously 
courting the black vote, tried at first to keep the black vote out of the 
Republican column, later to sway it from the Populist cause.  
Ironically, it was in the “black belt” where blacks outnumbered whites 
and where the preponderance of Alabama’s conservative forces 
                                                          
 14. The Republican Party was divided into two factions—the “black and tans” and 
the “lily whites.”  The black and tans felt that the blacks were the mainstay of the 
Republican Party in the South and thus supported voting rights for blacks.  The lily 
whites felt that blacks did not fit into a party that represents “intelligence, progress 
and higher civilization.”  MALCOLM COOK MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN ALABAMA:  A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM 261 (1955). 
 15. Other southern states—Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama along with 
some Western and Great Plains states had significant populist movements.  CARL 
DEGLER, THE OTHER SOUTH:  SOUTHERN DISSENTERS IN THE 19TH CENTURY 320 (1982). 
 16. Id. 
 17. The Populists, together with the Jeffersonian Democrats, nominated Kolb for 
governor in the 1890, 1892, and 1894 elections.  Historians believe that Kolb actually 
received more votes than were counted, but black belt Democrats stuffed ballot 
boxes to ensure a Democratic victory.  Despite the repeated defeats, Populists were 
elected to more than a third of the seats in the state legislature, two congressional 
seats, and to many county offices.  ROGERS, supra note 5, at 217-28, 271-86. 
 18. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 264 (indicating that blacks, with a population 
over 800,000, constituted a large minority of the state’s population). 
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resided, that the Bourbons were able to maintain state power against 
reform, defeat black aspirations, and stave off the Populist menace by 
means of rank fraud and manipulation of the black vote.19 
The time arrived, however, when the forces of aristocracy no 
longer wished to rely on fraud and manipulation of the black vote to 
capture one election after another.  The Populist agenda was too 
dangerous, Populist appeal too popular, Populist growth too 
alarming, and the enormity of the black belt vote fraud too 
embarrassing for the Bourbons to shoulder.  And, worst of all, the 
perils of Populism were compounded greatly by Populists’ courting 
blacks on issues dear to them but unwelcome by their overlords, like 
improving blacks’ (along with whites’) miserable economic existence, 
and purifying the electoral process, which to blacks meant not only 
the right to vote but to have their votes counted fairly.  These goals 
gave blacks, as individuals, a deep sense of personal pride; and, at the 
same time, gave blacks, as a community, a solid piece of political 
power. 
To many in the establishment—the Democratic Party, Bourbons, 
black belt aristocrats, bankers, affluent merchants, railroad and other 
corporations, as well as their lawyers—the situation was intolerable.  It 
called for drastic measures to bedevil the current Populist scourge 
and to inoculate the body politic from the threat of any similar 
plague in the future.  In Alabama, as in many other states, the black 
belt led the way. 
The Bourbons felt a solution lay in further manipulation of the 
electoral system.  The electorate had to be pruned of those 
constituting a major part of the threat: the poor, the uneducated, 
those without property, and the indebted.  Additionally, the pruning 
needed to be substantial if political dominance was to be assured.  
New voting prerequisites provided the key by addressing two prime 
attributes of class, wealth and education.20  It is important to 
understand what else the southern disenfranchisers contemplated.  
They also hoped to snatch the ballot away from those economically 
desperate whites, backs to the wall, to whom the Populist message was 
alluring, and from whose ranks had sprung an imposing collective 
resistance to Bourbon rule.  Thus, in the ensuing assault on the 
ballot, the class and race of the quarry were intertwined. 
                                                          
 19. Money, alcohol, and intimidation were used to influence voters.  Ballot boxes 
were stolen to ensure that the Democratic candidates won over Populists.  Id. at 219-
20, 230; ROGERS, supra note 5, at 222-24. 
 20. By alluding to class, I do not mean to understate the significance of race and 
the special devastation inflicted on black suffrage, as well as all other facets of black 
life, by an endemic racism of national proportions. 
WESCHLER.PRINTER.DOC 12/4/2002  1:38 PM 
30 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:23 
I. THE 1901 ALABAMA SUFFRAGE PLAN 
On November 11, 1900, the Alabama electorate adopted a new 
state Constitution along with the new suffrage provision it contained.  
The Constitution was proclaimed to be in effect on November 28, 
1901.  Nothing in this document played a more important role than 
suffrage issues.21  At the core of the suffrage issues lay the literacy, 
property, and grandfather clauses. 
Against the backdrop of southern reality, the new suffrage 
prerequisites might more accurately be characterized, not as property 
and literacy, but as wealth and education.  To exclude field and 
factory workers, “the downwardly mobile and geographically 
transient,” on the move in search of employment, voter registration 
would now turn on such class characteristics as minimum property 
holdings; ability to pay poll taxes; uninterrupted employment; 
literacy; recondite constitutional interpretation; and lengthy fixed 
residence.22 
Under the newly proposed electoral regime, wealth meant property 
holdings.  Literacy, with variations, meant the ability to read and 
write.  Literacy is a creature of education and education is historically 
interlocked with class.  At the turn of the century, education was 
highly improbable for the offspring of southern white or black 
sharecroppers or the urban poor.  Many southern states spent a 
pittance on public education.  Child labor was rampant, often 
essential to the most meager level of survival for countless families.  
Pre-pubescent and adolescent children toiled day and night in textile 
mills.23  Others stayed home to work the farm.  For those reasons, 
southern illiteracy ran high. 
Blacks, only recently emerged from slavery and still oppressed by its 
conspicuous vestiges, were the poorest and least educated of the 
southern populace.  Accordingly, the disenfranchising plan, so 
riveted on class, would unquestionably hit them the hardest.  But 
poor and poorly educated whites, also large in numbers, would likely 
suffer the same fate, for Bourbon Democrats were determined to rid 
the election rolls of them too.  Bourbons repeated over and over 
again, like a catechism, that the ballot belonged to the “intelligent 
                                                          
 21. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, §§ 177, 180, 181. 
 22. GEORGE TINDALL, THE PERSISTENT TRADITION IN NEW SOUTH POLITICS 40 
(1975). 
 23. See WILLIAM MABRY, THE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS SINCE 
RECONSTRUCTION 74 (1940) (explaining that in 1903, South Carolina, taking a 
progressive leap forward, passed a law forbidding employers from hiring children 
under the age of twelve and limiting the working hours of children age twelve 
through seventeen to sixty-six hours a week). 
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and virtuous,” not to the “ignorant and vicious.”24  In that respect, the 
color of the voter cut no great divide.  In fact, poor whites may have 
constituted the graver danger.  As serious a pestilence as independent 
black voters were to the Democratic Party, it was a majority white 
Alliance/Populist movement that convulsed the South for almost a 
decade and came close to toppling the Bourbons from power. 
Poor whites understood well enough that wealth and education 
requirements were likely to cause them, as well as blacks, to lose their 
right to vote.  It was precisely for that reason that they defeated 
similar proposals to limit suffrage in Alabama when that state 
adopted its 1867 Constitution,25 showing such strength in victory that 
the issue was not even raised when Alabama adopted its 1875 
Constitution.26 
Nevertheless, Alabama’s radical Bourbons, persevering, tried to call 
a constitutional convention on the same issue in 1892.  That bid also 
failed and for the same reason.27  Moreover, to many northern 
Alabama whites, scant of money, arable land, and formal education, 
the notorious thirteenth plank in Alabama’s Democratic Party 
platform of 1892 left the party’s intentions undisguised: “We favor the 
passage of such election laws as will better secure the government of 
the state in the hands of the intelligent and virtuous and will enable 
every elector to cast his ballot secretly and without fear of restraint.”28  
Alabama Populists would not let plank thirteen fade in people’s 
memory. 
Faced with the perils of Populism, the Bourbons had to find some 
way to induce whites in Alabama, as in the rest of the South, to 
approve a plan limiting suffrage to the affluent and educated, thus 
disenfranchising most blacks, and, in the process, an untold number 
                                                          
 24. See 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE 
STATE OF ALABAMA 2875, 2958, 3022, 3093, 3282, 3333 (1901) [hereinafter OFFICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS]; MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 268 (quoting John B. Knox, Chairman of 
the Democratic State Executive Committee and delegate from Alabama to the 
Democratic National Convention in 1892 and 1896, as saying that the primary reason 
for the disenfranchisement of blacks was to establish “white supremacy by law” 
because “[t]here is in the white man an inherited capacity for government, which is 
wholly wanting in the Negro . . . [t]he Negro . . . is descended from a race lowest in 
intelligence and moral perceptions of all the races of man.”). 
 25. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 135-50. 
 26. Id. at 189-210. 
 27. Id. at 249-54. 
 28. Id. at 249-50 (citing MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 9, 1892).  Republicans 
also favored changes in the electoral system.  See Lodge, supra note 10, at 299 
(discussing the possibility of using state election strategies or the Australian system as 
a model for a federal election law).  The secret, or Australian ballot, was devised to 
work against illiterates by failing to identify candidates by party and, as in Virginia, 
requiring people to vote in two and one-half minutes.  MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 
220 n.15. 
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of white voters.  The idea of white supremacy supplied a good part of 
the methodology.  White supremacy always constituted the white 
south’s critical and familiar battle cry during Reconstruction and 
post-Reconstruction.  The core of the doctrine was that blacks were 
innately and unalterably inferior and for that reason, should never be 
permitted to govern.  Rather, blacks must always be governed by 
whites and (with an important addendum, whether explicit or 
implicit) for the benefit of white people.  To disenfranchise blacks, 
therefore, and to “take back the South,” an even more vociferous call 
rang out for white supremacy. So it was that white supremacist 
oratory permeated the air as never before.29 
It was not that difficult for the South’s ruling elite to promote 
white supremacy among poor white southern throngs.  During 
slavery, impoverished whites might console themselves with the belief 
they were blessed with the “badges of supremacy,”30 a status they 
viewed as infinitely superior to the slaves toiling about them.  As we 
know, after slavery came to an end, many of the “badges and 
incidents of slavery” still endured for black Americans.  However, 
many of the badges of supremacy also lingered among ordinary white 
people.  Recognizing the contradictions inherent in the relationship 
between blacks and poor whites, the southern Bourbons astutely 
continued to pursue white supremacy with particular emphasis on 
poor whites.  The tactic did not prove ineffective as class frequently 
bows to color.31  Surveying our own history, anti-black sentiment has 
too often prevailed, its beneficiaries most frequently those at the top 
of the scale, not those at the bottom. 
                                                          
 29. The following examples were typical.  When Democrats succeeded in 
replacing the Republicans in Baltimore in 1899, they used the slogan “This is a White 
Man’s City.”  MARGARET LAW COLLCOTT, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND POLITICS 99 (1969).  
Maryland’s Democratic candidate for Governor, Edwin Warfield, articulated the  
mantra of white supremacy in no uncertain terms: 
This election is a contest for the supremacy of the white voters in 
Maryland. . . . The elevation of the Negro is a well-nigh hopeless task, so long 
as they exercise like dumb, driven cattle, solidly and without intelligence or 
reason, their right of suffrage as a weapon of offense against the Democratic 
party, directed and guided by Republican politicians. . . . The white man is 
the highest type of human family; the Negro is the lowest.  God has made no 
other race equal of the Caucasian, and neither amendments to the 
Constitution nor anything else can do what God had failed to do:  that is, 
make the negro the equal of the white man. 
 Id. at 107-08. 
 30. William A. Brewer, Poor Whites and Negroes in the South Since The Civil War, 15 J. 
NEGRO HIST. 26, 27 (1930). 
 31. See generally R. HUCKFELDT & C. KOHFELD, RACE AND THE DECLINE OF CLASS IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1989).  
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The more successful the efforts of southern blacks and whites to 
work together politically in the late 1880s and 1890s, the more 
disconcerted and desperate the Bourbons became, substantially 
increasing their efforts to crush the opposition.  For instance, in the 
1890s, the relaxed racial attitudes of Arkansas Populists, compared 
with the Democrats, prompted the Democratic Arkadelphia Siftings 
to predict that “[t]his is a white man’s country, and white men are 
going to rule it, and when the third party opened its arms to the 
Negro at its state convention, it invited its certain death at the polls 
next fall.”32 
Public speakers and the North Carolina Democratic Party pressed 
the white supremacy issue, even forming white supremacy clubs.  The 
attack worked well.  In 1898, the Democratic Party defeated the once 
successful fusion between the Populists and the Republicans.  The 
News and Observer quoted the Chairman of the Democratic Party, who 
exclaimed that “North Carolina is a WHITE MAN’S state and WHITE 
MEN will rule it, and they will crush the party of Negro domination 
beneath a majority so overwhelming that no other party will ever dare 
to attempt to establish Negro rule here.”33  
Robert Aldrich, the Chairman of the 1895 South Carolina 
Constitutional Convention, lambasted South Carolina’s 1868 
Constitution that granted blacks the right to vote, saying it was “made 
by aliens, negroes and natives without character, all the enemies of 
South Carolina, and . . . designed to degrade our State, insult our 
people and overturn our civilization.”34 
And in Alabama, after being elected governor in 1890, Thomas 
Goode Jones editorialized that “it is [in] the Black Belt that the 
necessity for Caucasian supremacy is most keenly felt.”35  Joseph 
Johnston, after his 1896 nomination for governor of Alabama, 
declaimed: 
We do not believe in surrendering any section of our state to the 
control of the Negro . . . [for that] would be fatal alike to the peace 
and prosperity of both races.  We have no hostility for the colored 
man . . . but we do not believe he is fitted by birth, education or 
                                                          
 32. John Graves, Negro Disenfranchisement in Arkansas, 26 ARK. HIST. Q. 199, 205 
(1967), in 6 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992).   
 33. MABRY, supra note 23, at 49 (citing NEWS AND OBSERVER, Nov. 3, 1898). 
 34. Laughlin McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disenfranchisement of Blacks in 
South Carolina, 37 S.C. L. REV. 557, 570 (1986) (quoting JOURNAL OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1, 1-2 (1895)).   
 35. Rogers, supra note 5, at 219.  This is the same Thomas Goode Jones, who, a 
decade later, when Populism was no longer a credible threat to Alabama’s 
Democratic party, opposed that states’ adoption of a grandfather clause because, he 
said, it clearly discriminated against blacks otherwise eligible to vote. 
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experience, to engage in making or executing laws for the people 
of Alabama . . . .36 
The 1896 Alabama Democratic Party convention platform 
reinforced this clear goal of creating a steady progression of laws with 
the purpose of disenfranchising blacks and ensuring a predictable 
electorate:  “It is our purpose to maintain a government in Alabama, 
fair and just to all under control of the white men of Alabama.”37  In 
his splendid book on Alabama’s constitutional development, 
Malcolm McMillan unambiguously describes the Democratic Party’s 
goal of black and white disenfranchisement in 1901: “[w]ith a 
campaign cry of ‘white supremacy’ . . . [and] the support of the 
railroads . . . [the conservatives of Alabama] created a greatly reduced 
electorate with more conservative tendencies than the old.”38 
All the foregoing illustrates how anxious the Bourbons were to fuel 
the flames of racial antagonism, deflate the newly acquired balance of 
power blacks had achieved with such arduous struggle, and 
undermine that ominous threat from below, the Populists.  Ridding 
the election rolls of the growing and malignant southern pestilence—
black voters—topped the list of imperatives.  It was powerful racist 
weaponry.  But how was the Bourbon class to accomplish that goal 
while simultaneously convincing poor, uneducated whites that their 
vote would not be imperiled? 
****** 
This seeming conundrum was resolved by the Bourbons, who 
devised several qualifications for voting, among them the ingenious 
“grandfather clause,” which bestowed voting eligibility on males 
whose ancestors had served in the American military.39  To visualize 
the contending forces buffeting the grandfather clause, it is essential 
to compare the two different stages of voter registration: the 
Permanent and Temporary Plans.  They had but one major similarity: 
only males, twenty-one years or older, could register to vote.40 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 204-05. 
 37. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 304. 
 38. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 363.  Ben Tillman, later Governor of South 
Carolina, took his stand on white supremacy as a young man and became a member 
of the Sweetwater Saber Club.  Accoutered with uniforms, guns brandished, its 
members were determined to rid the state of all Negro influence at the polls.  To 
Tillman, it was quite simple, “[t]he Creator made the Caucasian of a better clay than 
he made any of the colored people.”  FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS, THE TILLMAN 
MOVEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA 39 (1964).  In his 1890 gubernatorial inaugural 
speech, Tillman was exuberant.  “Democracy has won a great victory unparalleled.  
The triumph of Democracy and white supremacy over mongrelism and anarchy is 
most complete.”  Id. at 136-37. 
 39.  See generally infra Part I.B (describing “The Temporary Plan”). 
 40. After unceasing struggles dating at least as far back as the 1848 New York 
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A. The Permanent Plan 
The permanent plan began on January 1, 1903, and was, as its title 
stated, to remain in force permanently thereafter.41  Under its 
provisions, no male could register to vote in Alabama (assuming he 
satisfied the residency conditions)42 unless he met one of two onerous 
requirements: 
(1) Requirement #1:  Literacy and Employment.  The applicant 
had to be able to read and write any article of the United States 
Constitution, and (unless disabled) have worked for the greater part 
of the year preceding registration;43 or 
(2) Requirement #2:  Property Ownership.  He or his wife had to 
own and reside on at least forty acres of land, or own personal 
property, either of which was assessed for taxation purposes at more 
than $300.00.44  
Thus, within a year after ratification of Alabama’s proposed 
Constitution, literacy and/or property holdings became permanent 
prerequisites to voting, impediments to what we consider today as the 
indispensable core of anything resembling democratic practice.  By 
design, voting under Alabama’s permanent plan was prohibitive to 
untold thousands of its male voters, black and white, because of 
poverty, lack of education, and periodic unemployment. 
B. The Temporary Plan 
Prior to December 20, 1902, any male could register to vote in 
Alabama (assuming he satisfied the residency conditions) if he served 
in the military, was the descendant of someone who served in the 
military, or was a person of good character and understood the 
obligations of citizenship.45  The Alabama electorate approved its new 
Constitution on November 11, 1901.  The temporary plan lasted 400 
days ending on December 19, 1902. 
                                                          
Seneca Falls Convention, women won the right to vote in the Wyoming Territory in 
1869, retaining it when Wyoming became a state in 1889.  Colorado enfranchised 
women in 1893, followed by Utah and Idaho in 1896 and by more states in the first 
two decades of the twentieth century.  See generally ELLEN DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND 
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMAN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-
1969 (1978); ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1958); JONI LOVENDUSKI & JILL HILLS, THE POLITICS 
OF THE SECOND ELECTORATE: WOMEN AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1981).  Finally, the 
Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibited the denial to vote on account 
of sex.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 41. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 181. 
 42. Id. § 177. 
 43.  Id. § 181. 
 44.  Id. 
 45. Id. 
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For uneducated white men with no property, the temporary plan 
amounted to relief, perhaps alluring but deceptive, from the harsh 
class commands of the permanent plan.  The permanent plan 
demanded substantial property holdings or both literacy and 
uninterrupted employment.  The temporary plan contained none of 
these limitations.  Under the temporary plan, applicants had to meet 
one of the three requirements: 
(1) Requirement #1: War Veterans.  This clause entitled all men to 
register who served in the United States Armed Forces during the 
War of 1812, the wars with Mexico or Spain, any war with the Indians, 
or who served on either the side during the Civil War, or in the 
National Guard or militia of any state.46  
(2) Requirement #2: Descendants of War Veterans.  If a man was 
not a veteran of the enumerated wars, he could still register if he was 
a descendant of any veteran of those wars or of the American 
Revolutionary War.47  This provision earned the label “grandfather 
clause” because it exempted a class of men, overwhelmingly white, 
from the rigors of the permanent plan, based on preexisting facts.48 
(3) Requirement #3: Good Character and Understanding.  The 
restrictions of having a good character and understanding the 
responsibilities involved with being a citizen opened the final escape 
hatch from the permanent plan.49  If the aspiring registrant was 
neither a veteran nor a descendant of a veteran, he might still qualify 
if he was a man of good character who understood the duties and 
obligations of a citizen under a republican form of government.50  
Good character by itself was not enough, neither was understanding 
the nature of our government.  Both elements were prerequisites to 
qualifying under this section.51   
The key to the entire temporary plan was the second requirement, 
the grandfather clause.  It offered the widest possibility for white 
registration.  The other two clauses were much less promising. 
It was anticipated that most white men were not war veterans and 
thus could not qualify under the first requirement.  “Who constituted 
the group in the soldier clause?” a delegate asked and then 
responded: 
                                                          
 46.  Id. § 180. 
 47.  Id. 
 48. Today’s use of the term “grandfathered” in other contexts has its origins in 
the disenfranchising constitutions of the South at the turn of the century. 
 49. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 180.  
 50. Id.  
 51.  Id. 
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The soldiers of 1812 have passed away and joined the ranks on the 
other side.  The soldiers in the Indian wars are gone.  The soldiers of 
the war with Mexico constitute an insignificant class.  There are 
probably not one hundred of them in Alabama.  The soldiers who 
served in the Confederate army have mainly crossed over the river.  
The average age of the soldier in the Confederate army when he 
entered was 35 or 36 years.  They entered from 16 to 60.  Add to his 
then age the thirty-six years that have passed since the war closed and 
you have 71.  So the man of average age who entered in the 
Confederate army has passed beyond his three score years and ten.  
There are only a few of them left.52 
The Good Character and Understanding Clause, the third 
requirement, was too vague and uncertain.  What did “good 
character” mean?  And exactly what were “the duties and obligations 
of citizenship under a republican government” that one was to 
understand?  Weren’t applicants under this clause at the mercy of 
local registrars?  Altogether, then, the terms “good character” and 
“understanding” were much too standardless to be reassuring to poor 
and uneducated voters and their advocates.53 
These severe limitations surrounding the War Veterans and Good 
Character and Understanding Clauses made the grandfather clause 
(“Descendants of War Veterans”) all the more important.  No other 
issue during the Convention’s suffrage debates, or in the campaign 
for ratification that followed, equaled the barrage of protest aimed at 
the grandfather clause.  John Knox, Convention President and ardent 
supporter of the clause, acknowledged that the “most strenuous 
opposition offered to the report of the Committee [was] directed 
against that part of the plan commonly known as ‘the grandfather 
clause.’”54  He conceded that this part of the plan “has been criticised 
and attacked from unexpected sources” and complained that the 
attack was “intempera[te] . . . and wholly unwarranted.”55 
The concepts of law and legality enveloped the suffrage debates.  
Again and again, the magnetic power of the law impelled delegates of 
all political hues to frame and resolve the issues in the time-honored 
language of law and in the name of the Constitution. 
This was nothing new, of course.  The primacy of law infused 
political discourse almost from the nation’s beginning.  The colonists 
were nursed on the Magna Carta and the English common law, and 
                                                          
 52. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2859-60. 
 53. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 294-95. 
 54. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2915. 
 55. Id. 
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when the time came, turned against the British themselves.  The 
written Constitution that ensued, later generations would expound 
grandiloquently, was epitomized in John Marshall’s adoration as “a 
government of laws, not of men.”56  Marshall’s aphorism would in 
time become interchangeable with one of America’s favorite 
beatitudes, the “rule of law.”  We might label this reverence for the 
Constitution, this preoccupation with the idea of Constitution, as 
Constitutionalism. 
Constitutionalism was not foreign to the people of Alabama.  The 
1901 gathering in Montgomery constituted that state’s sixth 
Constitutional Convention.  Constitutionalism, neatly verbalized by 
former Governor Jones pervaded this Convention:  “I take it that no 
serious minded delegate, no delegate devoted to the welfare of his 
country . . . wants to adopt any plan which deliberately wars on the 
supreme law, and . . . which he believes is in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.”57 
Ironically this focus on Constitutionalism appears to have escaped 
some of its most fervent devotees at the Convention.  This was 
especially true in light of the unrepresentative composition of the 
delegates, the undemocratic disenfranchising enterprise on which 
they had embarked, and the bestowal of the franchise as a reward for 
lamentable past conduct. 
The grandfather clause rewarded a particular body of 
“descendants.”  Along with all the other white inhabitants of this 
nation, however, those “descendants,” including all the Convention 
delegates, occupied a land that had been wrested from another 
people.  “The U.S. Cavalry and the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
annihilated the Native American population whenever it stood in the 
way of the expansion of the United States.”58  And the U.S. 
Constitution broadly empowered Congress to govern those 
conquered tribes.59 
Here, at the Alabama Convention where delegates were rewriting 
their own state Constitution, no one noted the anomaly of specially 
anointing with the democratic right of suffrage, those who had 
engaged in that slaughter and theft of the land, those men who were 
veterans or the descendants of veterans of “any war with the Indians.”  
                                                          
 56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 57. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2887. 
 58. W.H. Locke Anderson, Cold Soldiers Never Die, 41 MONTHLY REV. 56, 58-59 
(1989) (reviewing T. SMITH, THINKING LIKE A COMMUNIST:  STATE AND LEGITIMACY IN 
THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND CUBA (1987)). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [3] To regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”). 
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On this discrete issue, the Suffrage Committee Report succeeded 
without debate.  It mattered little to the delegates that the clause did 
not similarly enfranchise the descendants of the victims of those wars. 
Moreover, on whatever other principles the nation was founded, it 
was grounded in no small measure on the institution of slavery.  The 
U.S. Constitution, while managing decorously to shy clear of the 
distasteful word “slavery,” shielded slavery and the slave trade from 
constitutional amendment for seventy-six years, bolstered the 
slaveholding states’ congressional representation by counting three-
fifths of their slaves, and barred a capitation tax.60 
By the time of the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention, no 
blacks remained in elective office in that state.61  Of the 155 delegates 
to the Convention, none were black.  Blacks had even been excluded 
from taking part in the conventions or voting in the primaries that 
selected the delegates to this Constitutional Convention.62  In fact, the 
majority of delegates at this assemblage had convened with the 
declared aim of disenfranchising blacks.  And they succeeded. 
II. PROTECTING THE UNEDUCATED WHITE VOTE 
Holy assertions abounded that “not a single white man” would be 
disenfranchised.  A “grandfather” exception would see to that.  Any 
man who had an ancestor that served in the American military or in 
any American war would be allowed to vote.  And there were plenty 
of those to look back to.  It would be the rare white man who did not 
have, or could not imagine, such an ancestor somewhere in his 
lineage.  Therefore, to vote, white men had only to summon the 
grandfather clause to be excused from scaling the twin barriers of 
property and education.  Not so, however, with most southern black 
men.  Although many black men fought in past American wars, the 
vast majority of southern blacks, freshly emerging from slavery, would 
be harder put to find such a “fighting grandfather.” 
Manifestly, then, blacks were a prime target of the well-aimed 
property and literacy projectiles.  They did not own much property, 
so they could not qualify under that provision.  Additionally, sixty 
percent of eligible blacks in Alabama could not meet the reading or 
writing requirements, automatically disqualifying them.63  Those who 
                                                          
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. 
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 61. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 3019. 
 62. Allen Woodrow Jones, A History of the Direct Primary in Alabama 1840-1903, 
at 178 (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of Alabama).  
 63. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 271, 276 (citing Bureau of the Census, 
Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900 (Washington, D.C.), I, 970); 6 APPELTON’S 
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were literate would probably be eliminated by arcane constitutional 
queries put to them by hostile, unelected, white registrars cloaked 
with unlimited discretion, who would only be doing the job expected 
of them: helping to create an almost totally white male electorate.  
With such a consummation, white supremacy would reign again, 
blacks would no longer hold a balance of power, electoral fraud 
would be eliminated, intra-white acrimony would diminish, and peace 
and prosperity would prevail.  Such were the broad brush strokes of 
the ideas the Bourbons painted as their vision of a southern future.   
In Alabama, as in some other southern states, the initial push for 
disenfranchisement came from the black belt and the planters who 
reigned supreme there.  Now at this Convention black belt delegates 
urged one of their numbers, Richard Jones, a Suffrage Committee 
member, to address the assemblage on behalf of the grandfather 
clause.  They had chosen wisely: Confederate officer, former 
president of the University of Alabama, lawyer, constitutional law 
professor, president of the State Bar, and—down-home racist to boot.  
Accepting his charge, Jones stoutly defended the clause, linking it, in 
a flight of cloying oratory, to white illiteracy.  “I was astonished,” he 
said, “to see how many of those [Alabama] soldiers [who I 
commanded during the Civil War] could not read [or] write [or] sign 
their names, and yet I declare to you there were no better soldiers in 
the Army . . . than those Alabamians who had patriotically gone out 
to defend the principles of the South on the battlefields . . . .”64  
When these men came home from the war, Jones continued, they 
“wanted to educate their children” but could not.65 
I have heard some of them say, “If I just had the means to send my 
children to school and give them the advantages of an education, it 
would have been the very joy of my life, but I didn’t have the means 
to do it, and I had to put them to work.”  These children are of the 
same stock of the soldiers of whom I have spoken, and my right 
arm should be palsied before I would do anything to prevent them 
taking part in the government of Alabama.66  
By interjecting formal education into the grandfather clause 
debate, Jones presumably hoped to allay white fears of white 
disenfranchisement aroused by the new literacy test that required 
                                                          
ANN. CYCLOPEDIA 665 (3d ser. 1901) (indicating that of the 181,345 black males of 
voting age, only 73,399 were literate).  Only fourteen percent of white males could 
not meet the requirements.  MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 276. 
 64. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2881-82. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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registrants to read and write any part of the Constitution.67  To 
thousands of uneducated, functionally illiterate white men, Jones 
thus portrayed himself as proud protector of their embattled ballot.  
Yet ironically it was their ballots to which he and his disenfranchising 
Bourbon allies, in another part of the suffrage plank—the literacy 
clause—had just laid a devastating siege.68  As history later played 
itself out, the grandfather clause, to whose aid Jones scurried, did 
precious little to lift that siege.  Rather, two-thirds of a century would 
pass before Congress, in the 1965 Voting Rights Act, finally liberated 
the ballot from the suffocating literacy test. 
Leaving no doubt of his intentions, Jones affirmed his credentials 
as adulator of the color white, one who would prefer to have his 
“right arm . . . palsied” than to disenfranchise confederate soldiers’ 
children.  In stark contrast, however, he then proclaimed: “I would 
just as soon give a toddling child a razor in his hand expecting him 
not to hurt himself, as to expect the negro to use the ballot and not 
use it to his injury and to ours.  [For] God Almighty has made [the 
black man] different from the white man.  You had just as well try 
to . . . legislate a Negro into a white man . . . It is impossible to do 
it.”69 
The grandfather clause thus became the lubricant of Alabama’s 
suffrage strategy.  Property and literacy clauses were to obliterate the 
black vote.  Without some relief, the same destiny awaited thousands 
of poor uneducated white men and ratification was hopeless without 
assurance that this would not occur.  The grandfather clause was to 
provide the guarantee.  As events unfolded, however, the grandfather 
clause assumed a very different primal function.  It safeguarded the 
white man’s vote in order to muster that vote in favor of ratifying a 
suffrage plan, geared to wealth and education, which would in due 
time and by design also wipe out much of the unaffluent, uneducated 
white male vote.  That was the crowning irony of the grandfather 
clause. 
The grandfather clause met powerful opposition, not only from 
blacks, but for clashing reasons.  Whites, Populists, and Republicans 
resisted, some because it discriminated against blacks, but most 
because they understood that the grandfather clause, limited to a one 
year registration period, would not ultimately save the bulk of the 
                                                          
 67. See id. at 289 (describing other delegates’ support for the grandfather clause 
based upon the necessity to exempt the sons of Confederate soldiers who were 
illiterate because of the “fortunes of war”). 
 68. See id. at 349-50 (noting passage of the literacy requirement amendment, with 
Richard Jones voting in support).  
 69. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2880-81. 
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white vote from the ravages of the disenfranchising scheme.  Some 
members of the ruling elite also fought the grandfather clause 
because they thought it unconstitutional, a reversion to English 
hereditary privilege, unfair to blacks, or too permissive in allowing 
lower class whites to vote. 
******** 
No one at the Convention, as far as we know, was poor or 
uneducated.  The delegates included twelve bankers, ninety-five 
lawyers (many of whom represented railroads and other corporate 
interests), four journalists, and numerous doctors, engineers and 
teachers.70  Sixty-two delegates were college graduates and twenty-
eight had finished at least a year of college.71  A powerful core at this 
all-white gathering was determined to disenfranchise poor 
uneducated white men.  They succeeded. 
During the steaming hot summer months of July and August 1901, 
the Montgomery Convention Hall walls reverberated with stentorian 
male voices on the future of suffrage.  No women sat in attendance as 
delegates, nor did they occupy the floor, rather they watched from 
distant galleries, powerless, mere observers of the scene.  To the 
highly influential Montgomery Advertiser, the leading Bourbon 
newspaper in the state, the May opening of the Convention 
presented a quaint and lovely vision.  “The galleries had filled to 
overflowing with beautiful women and brave men and was an 
attractive picture to look upon.”72  Southern sentimental stereotypes 
of pretty belles notwithstanding, women did not hold any elective 
public office in Alabama; neither could they vote in Alabama, nor 
anywhere else in the union.  Undaunted by prohibitive odds against 
success, women suffragists mustered their forces and resolutely 
petitioned the all-male Constitutional Convention to enfranchise the 
women of Alabama.73  The women did not succeed.74 
Against this backdrop of undemocratic representation and 
intentions, the Convention nevertheless resonated with learned legal 
precedent and glowing constitutional oratory.  If the commanding 
culture of law and Constitution were not enough to imbue the 
                                                          
 70. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 263 (citing MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 25, 
1901 and July 30, 1901). 
 71. Id. 
 72. MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 22, 1901, at 1. 
 73. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 278-79 (indicating that although the Suffrage 
Committee did not give serious consideration to suffrage for women, Virginia Clay 
Clopton and Frances Griffin petitioned the Convention on behalf of the female 
voting rights, garnering a few male delegate supporters). 
 74. See id. (noting that the women’s suffrage measure was defeated by a vote of 87 
to 22) (citing 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 3873-74). 
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Convention with the spirit of Constitutionalism, the presence of 
ninety-five lawyers (many of them luminaries in the law), comprising 
sixty-one percent of the 155 delegates, would certainly achieve that 
result.  And on the issue of the grandfather clause, the focus on 
Constitutionalism animated the debate. 
The grandfather clause, pivotal to the disenfranchising plan, 
galvanized the most formidable resistance to the Suffrage 
Committee’s majority report.  In an aura of Constitutionalism, the 
protest probed, more than did any other issue the Convention had to 
face, the very meaning of the Constitution and, more particularly, the 
future of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
A. The Minority Report:  Opposition to the Grandfather Clause 
Disenfranchisement, grandfather clause and all, was the disfigured 
offspring of the Bourbons, lords of the New South and Democratic 
Party, accosted of late by a bunch of discontented, disrespectful 
Populists, an ambitious lot that spoke to power, not as supplicants, 
but as contenders for the throne.  Yet a minority of Bourbons, some 
eminent, spurned the grandfather clause and waged a battle royal 
against it, yielding only at the last moment when the entire suffrage 
plan came up for final vote.75  Better, they no doubt ultimately 
concluded, to live with a grandfather clause confined solely to 
current (not prospective) poor, ignorant, white male voters than to 
see the Bourbons’ complete disenfranchising plan, their grand 
blueprint for a politically sustainable future, go down to ignominious 
defeat. 
Four Suffrage Committee members, Frank White, George 
Harrison, William Oates, and Stanley Dent, all Bourbons, all 
prestigious, all Confederate veterans, issued a minority report76 
condemning the grandfather clause in resounding terms. 
[The grandfather clause] violates the Federal Constitution . . . .  It 
undertakes, by indirect means, to deny or abridge the right to vote 
to citizens of the United States, on account of race, color or 
previous condition of servitude, which is forbidden by the Fifteenth 
Amendment . . . .  The clause . . . does not erect a standard of 
qualifications applicable to both races, but establishes an arbitrary 
standard, which, considered in connection with the history of the 
country, confers the right of suffrage on members of the white race 
(who are descendants of such soldiers) and denies it to members of 
the black race, who are not such descendants . . . .  It establishes a 
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permanent, hereditary, governing class, which is undemocratic, 
unrepublican, and un-American.77 
In addition to this foursome, a number of other prominent 
delegates took the floor to combat the grandfather clause, often 
eloquently, and for various reasons.  Two compelling critiques, not 
easily overcome, branded the cause, first as unconstitutional, and 
second, as suffrage by heredity. 
First in importance was the charge that the clause violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibition against abridging the right to vote 
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.78  The 
majority of southern white males, but only a small percentage of 
southern black males, qualified under the grandfather clause.  Of 
course, blacks participated in large numbers in prior American wars.79  
An estimated 5,000 free blacks served in the Revolutionary War.80  
Two black battalions helped defeat the British at New Orleans in the 
War of 1812.81  Black regiments also fought in many battles during 
the Mexican War.82  During the Civil War, approximately 186,000 
blacks served in the Union Army and 26,000 in the Union Navy—
212,000 blacks in all;83 16 of them received the Medal of Honor; 75 to 
100 were commissioned officers; 38,000 black soldiers died in the 
carnage of that war.84 
This does not tell the full military story of southern blacks, most of 
whom were slaves at the start of the Civil War.  Unlike free blacks, 
slaves were never admitted into the military as fighting soldiers.  Of 
the 212,000 black servicemen who fought in the Civil War, only 
93,000 came from the seceding states; less than five percent of the 
                                                          
 77. Id. at 1265-66. 
 78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2 (providing that “[t]he right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude” and that 
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 79. See generally TRACY BARNETT, THE BUFFALO SOLDIERS (2002); JACK D. FONER, 
BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1974). 
 80. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:  A HISTORY OF NEGRO 
AMERICANS 135 (6th ed. 1988); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 
11 (2d ed. 1992). 
 81. FRANKLIN, supra note 80, at 100-01. 
 82. Black military regiments, called Buffalo Soldiers, fought along the Western 
frontier and the border with Mexico.  In July of 1866, Congress approved legislation 
creating six all black regiments to serve in the peace time armies of the United 
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Infantry.  See, e.g., The Buffalo Soldiers, at http://www.toptags.com/aama/bio/ 
groups/buff.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).  Cf. Alvin J. Schexnider, The Development 
of Racial Solidarity in the Armed Forces, 5 J. BLACK STUD. 415, 417-18 (1975) (noting that 
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 83. FRANKLIN, supra note 80, at 286. 
 84. Id. at 290. 
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almost four and a half million blacks held in slavery in 1860, when 
the war began.85  As the Union Army fought their way into the South, 
thousands of slaves escaped and fled north, many joining the Union 
Army as soon as they could, serving in the military not as slaves but as 
free men.  But the Federal Government did not admit blacks into the 
military until President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation went 
into effect on January 1, 1863.86  Moreover, Alabama slaves who had 
not previously fled to freedom were not enlisted in the Union Army 
until Mobile fell in the spring of 1865.87  That further limited the 
number of Alabama blacks who had fought in the Civil War.  It also 
made no difference that slaves had participated in past wars as 
laborers, guides, messengers, cooks, teamsters, and hospital 
attendants.  They were still not deemed to have served in the armed 
services within the meaning of the grandfather clause. 
More than any other part of the disenfranchising scheme, the 
grandfather clause, with its inherent gross preference for white 
voters, cut to the heart of the Fifteenth Amendment.  This is how 
many opponents of the grandfather clause saw it.  Frank White, one 
of the four signatories to the Suffrage Committee’s minority report, 
laid out the facts underpinning the constitutional objections to the 
grandfather clause.  “[The Alabama] descendants of those who 
fought in the revolutionary war . . . the War of 1812 . . . the Indian 
wars, they are all white men.”88  As for the War Between the States, 
War Department records disclose that Alabama contributed only 
2,750 men to the Union Army, and at least two of the regiments were 
known to be white.89  On that basis, White estimated that at least 
ninety-five percent of the Alabama descendants of soldiers were white 
men and concluded that “[i]t is not a question of what we want.  It is 
a question of what we can do under the Federal Constitution.”90  
Drawing on law and lawyers for support, the delegates’ favorite 
argumentative technique, White was certain that: 
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 86. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2909. 
I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated 
States . . . are, and henceforward shall be free. . . .  And I further declare and 
make known that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into 
the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, 
and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service. 
Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862), in HENRY J. 
RAYMOND, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 260-61 (1865).  
 87. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2909. 
 88. Id. at 2860. 
 89. Id. at 2861. 
 90. Id. 
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every man in this Convention who is a lawyer will admit [this] is a 
discrimination against the negro . . . .  Your distinguished [United 
States] Senator, General [Frank] Pettus, one of the best lawyers in 
the South . . . investigated [a similar] provision in the Louisiana 
suffrage plan . . . and gave it as his written opinion that it violated 
the 15th Amendment.91 
Confederate General George Harrison, the second of the four 
signatories to the minority report, joined in attacking the clause on 
constitutional grounds.  “[F]our of us” on the Suffrage Committee he 
said, “tried to discharge our duty as confederate soldiers . . . . We are 
all white men in this Convention, we are very largely Democrats.”92  
But, he added, “we owe a duty to our common country . . . the federal 
union” as well as to our state and our political party.93  Harrison 
further stated that those delegates issuing the minority report 
“believe this grandfather clause to be unconstitutional.  So believing, 
however much I love my party or love my race, I cannot support [the 
clause] until I am satisfied that I am wrong in this opinion.”94  He 
then put this question to the assembled delegates: 
When we single out wars from the Revolution down, when the 
negro was not even a citizen and could not possibly participate in 
them, we simply say that these soldiers or their descendants, who 
were white men, may participate . . . .  Does not the negro have his 
right today?  And if you allow the white man to retain it, and not 
the negro, pray tell me is not this discrimination.  Isn’t it doing 
indirectly what the Constitution says directly we shall not do?95 
Leading the attack on the grandfather clause on the convention 
floor was William Oates, another signer of the minority report: 
Bourbon, lawyer, former congressman, former governor, a 
confederate officer with empty sleeve, mute evidence of an arm lost 
in battle.96  In 1894, Oates defeated Populist candidate Reuben Kolb 
for the governorship, with the help of the Democratic party’s 
sweeping ballot machinations.97  While regretting that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was enacted, Oates was adamant that the grandfather 
clause violated the Constitution.98  “To include a class of voters on 
grounds that are repugnant to the equality of rights and privileges 
that are common heritage of the people, violates the spirit of the 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 2860-62. 
 92. Id. at 2849. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2851. 
 96. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 191. 
 97. Id. at 226, 229; see supra notes 18, 20 (discussing fraud in Alabama elections). 
 98. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2798. 
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Constitution, if not its letter.”99  He asked the delegates, “suppose that 
this Convention was to declare, in favor of the negro race as voters, 
practically excluding the whites.  Would that be sustainable?”100  
Answering his own question:  “I think not.”101  He later added, “[w]e 
all took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States 
which says that no State shall disenfranchise any man because he is a 
negro . . . I intend to keep my oath.”102 
Sharing Oates’ opinion on the unconstitutionality of the 
grandfather clause was Thomas Goode Jones.  He too had 
impeccable credentials: scion of an elite southern family, 
Confederate major wounded four times in the war, Democratic Party 
patriarch, Bourbon, celebrated lawyer and long-time counsel for the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad.  He drafted the code of ethics for 
the Alabama State Bar Association and became president of the Bar.  
He, too, had been Governor, preceding Oates in that office from 
1890 to 1894, and he, too, was opposed by Kolb and the Populists.103  
At the Alabama Constitutional Convention, Jones insisted the 
grandfather clause contravened the Fifteenth Amendment.  It 
applied “one test . . . to a majority of the white people, and another 
test . . . to the majority of the black people; . . . our intention [is] to 
enfranchise the one and disenfranchise the other! . . .  How is it 
possible for this act to be constitutional, in view of [the] inevitable 
results?”104 
Some delegates, obviously impressed that constitutional objections 
to the grandfather clause came from such distinguished quarters—
lawyer/warrior/statesmen—were swayed by this eminence to support 
the Suffrage Committee’s minority report.  “The minority report,” 
said one delegate, “is signed by four of our number, who are known 
for their legal ability, who gave it as their opinion that [the 
grandfather clause] is violative of the Fifteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.  Ex-governor Thomas Goode Jones, who is 
acknowledged to be one of the best constitutional lawyers in the State 
says the same thing.”105  Furthermore, U.S. Senators “Morgan and 
Pettus are of the same opinion, and many others of our ablest men in 
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 103. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 228. 
 104. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2894. 
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the South agree with them on this point.”106 
Jones’ reputation with delegates as one of the best constitutional 
lawyers in Alabama stood him in good stead.  In September 1901, 
shortly after the Alabama Constitutional Convention disbanded, 
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed him United States Circuit 
Court Judge for the Middle and Northern Districts of Alabama.107  
This was the same Thomas Goode Jones, leading light of the Alabama 
Constitutional Convention, the same federal judge who, in 1903, 
would preside over the case of Giles v. Harris.108 
Jackson Giles brought the suit on behalf of himself and 5,000 other 
Montgomery County blacks that were exiled from the ballot box by 
the new Alabama State Convention.109  Clearly, resolution of this case 
would profoundly affect the future of voting rights in the United 
States.  In his complaint, Giles challenged, among other things, the 
constitutionality of the very grandfather clause that former Governor 
Thomas Goode Jones, as Convention delegate, had vigorously 
opposed on constitutional principle.110  How then in 1903, less than 
two years after the Convention, did Thomas Goode Jones, now Judge 
of the U.S. Circuit Court, choose to act on the complaint in that 
crucial case before him?  Quite simply.  He dismissed it.111 
The second major point of opposition to the grandfather clause 
was that it was undemocratic, reminiscent of the hereditary privileges 
of the British monarchy and nobility.  It conjured up elite 
prerogatives that American colonists deplored and against which they 
revolted.  “In the parliament of England they have hereditary peers 
and another class called life peers,” a delegate explained, “but in 
America we have no hereditary distinction, and cannot have any 
unless this instrument passes and becomes ratified.”112 
Stanley Dent, who joined the minority report, picked up its refrain.  
The grandfather clause violates “one of the great fundamental 
doctrines of Republican Government.”113  To create “an hereditary 
right or privilege” is to contravene “the spirit that has animated the 
people of this country from the Declaration of Independence down 
to this time . . . .”114  He further stated that the clause not only 
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 111. Id. at 486-88. 
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conflicted with the U.S. Constitution, but that it was incompatible 
with the proposed State Constitution.  With no dissent, he added, the 
Convention had just adopted Section 30, which declared that “‘no 
title of nobility or hereditary distinction, privileges[,] honor or 
emolument shall ever be granted’ . . . .  Isn’t it hereditary 
distinction,” Dent asked, “to say that because a man was a soldier, his 
son shall be entitled to register and vote without any regard to his 
qualifications . . . .”115 
Former Governor Oates joined in.  The grandfather clause is “un-
American.  Why should we have any inheritable political right?  Did 
you ever hear of it before.”116  Our country proceeds on the 
hypothesis that “every tub stands on its own bottom . . . [t]hat is 
Americanism.”117 
John Morgan, U.S. Senator from Alabama, also entered the lists 
against the grandfather clause, expressing his unequivocal views in a 
letter to Suffrage Committee dissenter Frank White who read the 
letter to the Convention.118  To Morgan, the grandfather clause was 
counterrevolutionary.  “The American revolution,” his letter began, 
“was not so much about redress of grievances, as it was a struggle to 
abolish heredity.”119  The “real line of division [was] between 
Democratic and regal government.”120  Morgan felt that forms of 
political heredity, such as prerogative and titular nobility, were not 
only prohibited by the Constitution, but that they had also helped 
instigate the Revolution.  He further stated that those who would 
restore political heredity discredited the cause of Revolution.  
Morgan concluded his assault on the Suffrage Committee’s 
“ordinance of inheritable blood” with this warning: “When such a 
titled class of voters is created, it will soon occur to them that no 
other class should be allowed to vote, and they will usurp all power.”121 
In addition to the distaste for unconstitutionality and the anathema 
of hereditary privilege, adversaries of the grandfather clause exposed, 
though with less emphasis, other fissures in its armor.  They thought 
it doubtful the courts would find it constitutional.  The highest levels 
of the judiciary were still in the hands of that “other” political party.  
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General Harrison observed that the clause “will most likely be tested 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority of whom are 
Republicans.”122  Moreover, if the grandfather clause fell, Harrison 
believed the entire suffrage plan would disintegrate with it. 
Suppose the grandfather clause is held unconstitutional, what 
court on earth could tell who went in under one clause or the 
other?  There is nothing in here providing that it shall be kept 
separate.  They are so intermingled that no court could tell under 
which clause the voter registered.  Therefore, if one is 
unconstitutional, the whole would be void.123 
The suffrage plan called for no record keeping, no permanent 
chronicle of the specific suffrage provision under which each 
successful applicant had qualified to register.124  Accordingly, after 
striking down the grandfather clause, a court might be forced to trash 
the registration rolls completely because it could not determine who 
had or had not been registered under the tainted grandfather clause;  
a judicial jettison of the whole suffrage plan, particularly the 
property, literacy, and poll tax requirements, was not what the 
Democratic Party’s Bourbon leaders had in mind. 
Another reason for abjuring the grandfather clause was the 
congressional reaction it might provoke.  How “do you believe,” 
asked Harrison, “that a United States Congress composed of 
Republicans would [decide] a closely contested Presidential election 
when the vote of Alabama, Louisiana, and North Carolina, [each 
having] these contested [grandfather] clauses, would settle the 
contest?”125  Responding to his own query: “Methinks, I see, fellow 
delegates, a Republican Congress declaring that Alabama had not a 
republican form of government and refusing to count our 
votes . . . . [T]his is more than probable.”126 
Less contingent than a congressional deadlock in a close 
presidential contest, was the real possibility of losing a number of 
seats in the House of Representatives.  In enacting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the 39th Congress authorized future Congresses, 
should the need so arise, to decrease proportionally the 
congressional representation of states denying any of their male 
citizenry the right to vote.127  The relevant language of the 
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Amendment did not specifically mention blacks or the vanquished 
South, but the meaning was clear enough.  The prospect of 
congressional reduction of Alabama’s delegation to the House did 
not escape General Harrison’s notice. 
[A] Republican Congress is what I wish to warn you of . . . .  They 
are as partisan as we are and they will never submit to the 
[grandfather clause] on earth.  I for one cannot by my vote run any 
risk on [a] proposition that I feel will place Alabama again in the 
throes of reconstruction, and deprive her of her representation in 
the Congress of the United States.128 
Some Bourbons fought the grandfather clause on humanitarian 
grounds.  It was unfair to blacks and plainly undemocratic.  Former 
Governor Oates was explicit on this point.  “We claim a good deal for 
ourselves, as being Democrats, standing on Jeffersonian Democracy, 
and if we do, ought we to adopt any questionable means here in 
order to give white man the preference over the negro?”129  A 
moment earlier, he had focused on the idea of ancestral privilege 
creating an “inheritable political right” that was “un-American.”130  
Now at this point in the Convention, Oates took on the much more 
delicate and controversial side of democracy, the issue of race. 
It would be a mistake to stamp this show of concern for black 
political equity by some Bourbons as hypocritical because it was quite 
consistent with Bourbon paternalism.  In that dazzling incongruity of 
southern politics, the Bourbons were many contradictory things to 
many people.  They were the leaders of the party of white supremacy, 
yet contemptuous and distrustful of lower class whites to whom they 
pretended to curry.  They were a proud, white oligarchy, yet 
constantly beseeching former slaves and their progeny for electoral 
support.  They were patrons to individual black subordinates, fatherly 
protectors of what they deemed to be “an inferior race”131 
permanently consigned by providence to their benevolent wardship.  
Yet, they were willing beneficiaries of the manipulation and theft of 
the black vote in the black belt by which they foiled the Populist 
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 128. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2856. 
 129. Id. at 2797-98. 
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 131. See id. at 2793 (quoting Former Governor Oates, now Convention delegate: 
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threat and clung to the levers of power.  And above all, they were the 
rulers of the South during the era when free black women and men 
unquestionably suffered their greatest defeats. 
Opponents of the grandfather clause also pondered the black 
response to total black disenfranchisement and what that might 
portend for stability or rebellion—social conditions that all 
governments, especially those that are repressive, must seriously 
contemplate.  Former Governor Oates contemplated: 
[the potential for disruption if they were to] completely exclude 
the negro from participation—all participation—in the affairs of 
our State . . . did you ever . . . know of a people, and so large a 
minority not allowed any voice at all in the affairs of government 
who remained contented under that government?  Have you ever 
heard of so large a minority, who have been admitted into the 
participation of the affairs of government for thirty years, who were 
afterwards silenced?  Will not there be disturbances?. . . [Y]ou may 
live to see the time of outbreaks and troubles not now 
contemplated, such as every man who participates in making it thus 
will live to regret.132 
Aside from the question of violent disturbances, blacks performed 
much of the unskilled labor and no small portion of the skilled labor 
in the South, just as they had done under slavery.133  What if blacks 
reacted to disenfranchisement by leaving, Oates asked.  
“[W]ho . . . fixes all these telegraph and telephone poles on the 
street?  I have never seen a white man on those poles.  The negro 
performs nearly all of the labor down here in this country . . . .”134  
And because blacks were now “citizens of the United States,”135 
“[t]hey have the right to go . . . where they please . . . .”  And if they 
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left, “[t]hen what would you do for labor in the South?”136 
B. The Short, Unhappy Life of the Alabama Grandfather Clause 
The grandfather clause failed miserably.  The failure was not by 
inadvertence in fulfilling its avowed purpose, so widely trumpeted 
throughout the state—indeed, throughout the South: to safeguard 
the ballot of lower/working class white men; those least able to read 
and write any article of the Constitution; those to whom forty acres of 
land were but a distant dream; and those whose individual personal 
property, bundled altogether, did not even add up to $300, no 
trifling sum in those deflationary days.137  Alabama’s grandfather 
clause did not disintegrate merely because the Supreme Court held 
such clauses unconstitutional in 1915.138  Rather, it perished under 
the death blow of the very provision that created it in 1901, for 
Alabama’s grandfather clause was part of the Temporary Plan, which 
was to last only a little more than a year, until December 19, 1902.139  
After that date, no one could register under any of the Temporary 
Plan’s three clauses—veteran, grandfather, or good character and 
understanding. 
This meant that registration under the grandfather clause was only 
possible for white men who reached their twenty-first birthday by 
December 19, 1902, made the effort to register and in fact had been 
registered on or before that date.  It made no difference that many of 
those white men were registered voters under the 1875 Constitution 
right up to the very day the 1901 Constitution replaced it.  The new 
Constitution simply wiped out their old registration and they were 
required to register again.  If men failed to re-register before 
December 20, 1902, they lost the opportunity to take advantage of 
the veteran, grandfather, or good character clauses.  Moreover, the 
grandfather clause would not be available for white men who were 
not yet twenty-one on December 20, 1902; nor for previously 
unregistered white men who were of age in the year 1902, but who 
failed for one reason or another, to register in 1902; nor for white 
men who were of age in the year 1902, but moved to Alabama after 
1902; nor for white men who were born after the year 1902; nor, 
presumably, for white men who reached the age of twenty-one by 
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 138. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915). 
 139. Supra Part I.B. 
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1902, but could not then meet the Constitution’s new residency 
requirement—two years in the State, one year in the county, and 
three months in the precinct;140 nor for white male immigrants who 
did not declare their intention to become citizens before ratification 
of the new Constitution, which was on November 11, 1901, a full fifty 
days before 1902;141 nor, of course, was suffrage available to any 
woman in Alabama. 
All in all, only a puny passage was left open for unlettered male 
issue of white warriors to wend their way to the ballot box.  This 
stingy confinement of the grandfather clause should have come as no 
surprise.  On the very first day of the Convention, John Knox, 
Convention President, spoke out unequivocally about the barbed 
wire barrier to registration that the Bourbon majority intended to 
erect.  “We are pledged ‘not to deprive any white man of the right to 
vote,’ but this does not extend unless this Convention chooses to 
extend it beyond the right of voters [already of age] now living.”142 
Badly outgunned Convention Populists, Republicans, and a 
sprinkling of Democrats, fought valiantly to stretch the Temporary 
Plan’s registration period, urgently pleading for a display of greater 
generosity to white men on the lower levels of the social scale.  
Against this impassioned entreaty, the Bourbons stood fast; not an 
extra day would they yield.  They had promised poor white men a 
bone, not a full meal.143 
Thus, the grandfather clause was vulnerable to withering critique.  
With the clause freighted with such fetid baggage, why did most 
Bourbons bother to defend it, nay insist upon it, this—the most 
indefensible provision of the Suffrage Committee report?  Without 
the grandfather clause, the entire disenfranchising plan—literacy, 
property, poll tax, etc., the whole edifice—might come tumbling 
down.  Ordinary white voters, fearful for the future of their franchise, 
leery of Bourbon motives, might, in combination with those black 
votes the Bourbons could not steal or purchase, deal a mighty death 
blow to ratification.  That’s how the majority of Bourbons saw it.  And 
it is to them we now turn. 
C. The Bourbon Majority:  Fathers of the Grandfather Clause 
The four signatories to the Suffrage Committee’s Minority 
Report—Frank White, George Harrison, William Oates, and Stanley 
                                                          
 140. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VII, § 178. 
 141. Id. § 180. 
 142. 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 15-16. 
 143. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 286-87. 
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Dent—were a distinct minority of the Bourbons in their opposition to 
the grandfather clause.  But their honorable effort should not 
unhinge history’s ultimate judgment on southern 
disenfranchisement: it was indeed the southern Bourbons, the 
southern ruling elites (including these four men) who devised, 
passed, and implemented the plan to disenfranchise almost all blacks 
and tens of thousands of poor whites. 
It must be born in mind that had these four Bourbon dignitaries 
carried the day and defeated the grandfather clause, not a single 
additional black man would have been added to, or kept on the 
registration rolls; and thousands of poor uneducated white men 
would have been unable to vote—effectively barred by the literacy 
and property tests.  Such a negative impact on ballot access did not 
appear to trouble the foursome at all. 
On the contrary, like the rest of the Bourbon delegates to the 
Convention, they were the disenfranchisers; they who were socio-
economically privileged; they who in the 1870s redeemed the South 
from the “evils of Reconstruction”; they who for twenty-five years 
thereafter stood astride the South like some unassailable colossus; 
they whose political/economic hegemony was, in those turbulent 
1890s, put in jeopardy.  They were not jeopardized by any branch of 
the Federal Government, not by the Republican Party, not by 
intrusive northerners, but by an enemy within, white and black:  
untold thousands of poor farmers, joined by a band of ordinary 
laborers, altogether a gaggle of Populists who no longer seemed to 
know or care about their proper station, their assigned place as 
servitors on the bottom rungs of the political, economic, social ladder 
of the New South. 
On the surface, Suffrage Committee member Richard Jones’ 
message was clear enough: the grandfather clause would rescue white 
ballots from the perils of illiteracy.  With that attractive proposition, 
delegate William Handley fully agreed.  “I know thousands of [young 
men] personally that cannot read and write, but they are splendid 
workers and pay their honest debts and they can come in under this 
old soldier clause. [T]he grandfather clause . . . is the most popular 
thing that there is . . . .”144 
Most popular?  Not according to lawyer, later Judge, Charles 
Ferguson, delegate from Birmingham in Jefferson County, Alabama’s 
most populous county, dotted with iron and steel mills, iron ore and 
coal mines, a focal railway center, a burgeoning metropolis teeming 
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with industrial workers.145  “For what purpose,” he asked, “is this 
grandfather clause placed in the Constitution, and why the necessity 
of it?”146  Responding to his own query:  “Is it not the prime purpose 
to get votes for the Constitution?”147  Then pointedly: “Gentlemen [at 
this Convention] argue here that the people in the hills want the 
[grandfather clause] . . . Speaking for the greatest white electorate in 
the State . . . I never saw such overwhelming sentiment against a 
proposition in my life, as there is in the county of Jefferson against 
this grandfather clause.”148 
The opposition did not prevail.  The Convention approved the 
grandfather clause.  The voters ratified it; or so it appeared.  A 
Supreme Court majority, aloof to black adversity and indifferent to 
disenfranchisement, black or white, dawdled over Alabama’s suffrage 
plan in Giles v. Harris,149 and then, in a barely intelligible Holmes 
                                                          
 145. As the Convention delegate from Jefferson County, Ferguson occupied a 
special place.  Jefferson County included the city of Birmingham.  Birmingham and 
Mobile were the two largest cities in Alabama at the turn of the century.  
Birmingham unquestionably played a major role in Jefferson County, which had a 
vast white electorate.  Birmingham was highly urban and by far the most 
industrialized city in Alabama, leading the nation in pig iron production.  The 
average wage in iron foundries was higher in Birmingham than in Alabama’s 
agricultural fields.  In the midst of that working culture, Jefferson County 
experienced powerful labor turmoil when Northern Alabama Coal Miners walked off 
the job in sympathy with the 1894 general strike call by the United Mine Workers of 
America.  ROGERS, supra note 5, at 93-97.  Birmingham also had a large black 
population.  Blacks comprised between fifty-five and sixty-five percent of the 
industrial labor force and occupied ninety percent of unskilled labor positions—the 
hardest and lowest paid work in Birmingham.  Carl V. Harris, Reforms in Government 
Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama 1890-1920, 38 J. S. HIST. 567, 570 (1972).  
Because blacks so uniformly and vigorously opposed the grandfather clause, we may 
assume that Ferguson was not unmindful of their bitter reaction to it.  JOHN WHITSON 
CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY:  ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 162-63 (1982).  As Cell puts it, “[o]nly the populist 
challenge, which threatened the hegemony of both groups, eventually brought them 
together.”  Id. at 164.  Cell also agrees with other notable scholars that “[t]he 
political economy of the New South . . . had mainly class determinants.”  Id. at 168.  
For the political and economic role of Birmingham at the turn of the century, see 
JONATHAN M. WIENER, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH: ALABAMA 1860-1885, at 162-
85 (1978). 
 146. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2932-33. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).  This case involved a bill of equity on behalf of black 
citizens of Montgomery County, Alabama to compel the Board of Regents to enroll 
them on the voting lists.  Id. at 482.  The plaintiffs, otherwise qualified to vote, 
claimed they were arbitrarily denied registration because of their color and that 
certain sections of the Alabama Constitution were inconsistent with the United States 
Constitution.  Id.  The Court dismissed the case, stating that equity could not compel 
the Court to enroll the plaintiffs under the same registration provisions they argued 
were void.  Id. at 484.  The Court held that legislative relief, rather than judicial 
action, was necessary because simply registering blacks under a flawed system would 
not cure the alleged fraud.  Id. at 487-88. 
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opinion, refused to decide the case, a lethal blow to the 
advancements of Section 1983.  Equity, federal court power to issue 
injunctions, was, as Holmes and the Court majority saw it, much too 
frail to come to the aid of political rights, a lame and disempowering 
doctrine that tenaciously persevered for years to come. 
Fourteen years after the Alabama Convention, the Supreme Court 
struck down the grandfather clause.150  This made little difference.  It 
was too late.  Literacy, property, poll tax, and similar clauses, left 
firmly in place, had already done their disreputable work.  The 
grandfather clause, part lure, part ruse, paved the way.  Virtually all 
blacks were now disenfranchised and so, too, were thousands of 
impecunious whites in Alabama and throughout the South. 
I am in agreement with John Whitson Cell that it is dangerous for 
people under a republican form of government to establish a class of 
voters to which other voters cannot attain.151  Federal equity was 
unavailable to heal the wounds.  With the passage of time, the 
situation grew worse.  For the next several decades, the region 
commonly referred to as the “Solid South” was a collection of one-
party states, governed generally from on-high, poor and 
underdeveloped.  The “Solid South” was, in many respects badly 
deformed by its strong commitment to racial apartheid, elite suffrage, 
malapportionment, rule by or for the upper-class, anti-trade 
unionism,152 and vast economic disparities.153  A vital Populist 
movement was no longer on the scene to arrest this development. 
                                                          
 150. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that Oklahoma 
suffrage provisions violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they denied blacks 
the right to vote); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (holding that Maryland 
suffrage provisions violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they denied blacks 
the right to vote). 
 151. CELL, supra note 145. 
 152. For the deleterious effects of racism within the southern labor movement 
itself, particularly in mid-twentieth century Alabama during George Wallace’s 
governorship, see Robert Norrell, Labor Trouble: George Wallace and Union Politics in 
Alabama, in ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH (Robert H. Zeiger 
ed., 1991). 
 153. For a more upbeat view of some progressive elements in the South during 
this period, see C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGIN OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951). 
